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Title
How middle-men can undermine anti-corruption reforms |
Full text
http://hdl.handle.net/10202/93 |
Date
2005 |
Author(s)
Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Torsvik, Gaute; Tungodden, Bertil |
Abstract
The anti-corruption reform in the Tanzanian tax bureaucracy in the mid-1990s was apparently a short-lived success. In the wake of the reform, a number of "tax experts" established themselves in the market, many of them being laid off tax bureaucrats. We argue that middle -men can undermine the effect of an anti-corruption reform by reducing the uncertainty that firms face vis -à-vis a reformed tax bureaucracy, which in turn may encourage firms to pay bribes rather than taxes. Indeed, under some circumstances, middle-men can cause corruption to be higher after the reform than before the reform. Since the demand for middle -men may increase with the extent of the reform, we also demonstrate that a small reform may be more efficient in combatting corruption than a more radical reform. |
Subject(s)
Corruption; Reform; Middle-men; Institutions; Tanzania |
Language
en |
Publisher
Chr. Michelsen Institute |
Relation
CMI Working paper; WP 2005: 1 |
Type of publication
Working Paper |
Identifier
82-8062-103-2; 0804-3639 |
Repository
Bergen - Christian Michelsen Institute
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Added to C-A: 2008-12-22;03:22:13 |
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