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Title
Crafting security council mandates |
Full text
http://hdl.handle.net/1885/42120 |
Date
2004 |
Author(s)
Roland, Rich |
Contributor(s)
Political Science Program, RSSS; ANU |
Abstract
Conclusion: Having described the alchemy through which mandates are forged and having analysed problematic aspects of mandates, how can one conclude the study and appraise the process? One obvious difficulty is that of selectivity. By focusing on the interventions shaped by mandates, those situations that fall outside the realm of the possible in international politics also fall outside the appraisal process. So appraising mandates tells us nothing about the fate of Chechnya or self-determination for Kurdish people or the future of Tibet. Focusing on the interventions themselves poses further problems of appraisal. Is an intervention successful because fighting stopped or ceasefires were maintained? This is often the media interpretation of events and thus a key component in shaping public perceptions. But the fundamental question of the health of the polity that is the subject of the intervention remains unanswered if we look simply at the cessation of hostilities. Measuring state building is a difficult medium to long-term venture. Perhaps the best political measurement is the satisfaction with the UN intervention by the parties principal including not only the leaders and factions within the polity but also the key actors in the international community such as the permanent members, the troop and civilian staff contributors and the neighbouring countries. It is perhaps on this basis that the 1995 Agenda for Peace claimed that in most cases the interventions have been conspicuously successful with Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique drawing particular praise. Many commentators would agree with this general comment. The success of an intervention tells us that the clear and practical mandate was well suited to the result being sought. But the success of the intervention is also due to the five other factors said to be critical: the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. So the mandate is only one part of the formula. Within the process of judging the intervention as a whole, mandates need to be appraised on their clarity and practicality. A workable mandate will comprise mainly of action tasks that are simply described for the benefit of both the implementers and the subjects. Many of these tasks will be measurable in terms of performance, cost and timeliness. A workable mandate will avoid vague compromise words that paper over essential differences and thus leave the dilemma unresolved and in the hands of the implementers. A workable mandate will have direction and closure. The end point may not always be predictable but the direction should be clear and a point should be ascertainable where the emergency intervention ends and the regular processes of development assistance take over. A workable mandate will have a defined division of labour. This may be based on subject matter, on geographical area or on organisational competence. One of the avoidable problems referred to in Agenda for Peace concern difficulties with coordination arising from the various specific mandates decreed for the agencies by discrete intergovernmental bodies. The UN has the responsibility to coordinate its various inputs into a coherent effort. It is open from the foregoing analysis to conclude that the UN process of developing mandates for democratisation and state-building purposes have improved with practice. Mistakes have clearly been made but they have contributed to the learning and drafting process. It would be unrealistic to demand that the vagaries of international politics be somehow eliminated from the process of decision-making and formulation of mandates. The power of the permanent members can be seen as a way of channelling realpolitik into the decision-making process. For that reason alone, it would be futile to demand consistency. Interventions that have a direct impact on one of the permanent members will not be treated in the same way as the more remote situations. To what extent should democratisation be a priority in the mandate? The problem with asking this question is that democratisation competes with the reestablishment of security and the provision of humanitarian aid as the three major thrusts of mandates. There can hardly be a process of democratisation without a generally secure environment and humanitarian aid in an emergency situation is clearly a priority for the subject peoples. The better way of posing the question is to ask whether sufficient priority is being given to the democratisation process. That is a valid question because without a democratisation process it is unlikely that the polity can ultimately achieve a form of governance that will encourage reconciliation and favour long-term recovery socially and economically. The reply, inevitably, is yes and no. Yes, democratisation has found a place in the UNs rhetoric and in its mandates. As one practitioner noted ruefully, even delegates from non-democratic countries happily accept the inclusion in mandates of provisions for free and fair elections and support for civil society. Mandates have become more sophisticated and the UNs response is improving with experience. There have been significant achievements in half a dozen difficult situations and a willingness to build on these processes in the future. But there is also a negative response. The problem is one of maintaining focus. Democratisation is not achieved by putting out fires, nor is it established by a single transition election; it is a long-term process requiring the patience to endure setbacks and to accept the slow pace of reform. Each new crisis faced by the UN naturally detracts attention from the smoky ruins of the last fire. The funds required for the long haul are often inadequate and the benefits gained initially are put at risk. A mandate can therefore only begin a process of democratisation. It can put some of the basic foundations in place and set a certain direction. Thereafter the process of democratic transition and consolidation is in the hands of many actors and political forces. No more should be asked of the UN interventions in the field. - no |
Subject(s)
mandates; SecurityCouncil; UnitedNations; financial and logisticsupport; military; police; civilianpersonnel; democratisation; security; humanitarianaid; scls-pltc |
Language
en_AU |
Type of publication
techreport |
Format
378819 bytes; 354 bytes; 384 bytes; application/pdf; application/octet-stream; application/octet-stream |
Rights
no |
Identifier
Seminars; may; 2004; 2583 |
Repository
Canberra - Australian National University
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Added to C-A: 2008-12-22;02:01:34 |
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